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LABOR LAW
VETERANS' REEMPLOYMENT RIGHTS EXPANDED
Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
Section 9(b) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act'
requires employers to either restore veterans to the positions they en-
joyed prior to the period of their military service or, alternatively, to
place them in other positions of similar "seniority, status and pay."'2
However, this seemingly clear mandate is obfuscated by the language
of section 9(c)(1) of the Act,3 which provides that reemployed veterans
are to be considered as having been on "leave of absence" during their
military service. Although they are restored without loss of seniority,
they are eligible only for "insurance or other benefits"4 accruing to
employees who have been on leave of absence for an equal amount of
time. Thus, section 9(c)(1), instead of conferring upon the returning
veteran the benefits resulting from continuous employment, analogizes
the status of the veteran to that of a nonveteran employee returning
150 U.S.C. § 459(b) (1970):
(b) Reemployment rights
In the case of any such person who, in order to perform such training and
service, has left or leaves a position (other than a temporary position) in the
employ of any employer ...
sha(B) If such position was in the employ of a private employer, such person
(i) if still qualified to perform the duties of such position, be restored by
such employer.., to such position or to a position of like seniority, status and
pay ....
Section 9 is a re-enactment of § 8 of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.
Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 8(b), 54 Stat. 890. Since the more recent statute is essen-
tially the same as the original, the cases decided under § 8 can be relied upon as precedent.
See S. REP. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1948).
250 U.S.C. § 459(b) (1970).
8Id. § 459(c)(1). This section provides in pertinent part:
(c) Service considered as furlough or leave of absence
(1) Any person who is restored to a position in accordance with the provi-
sion of paragraph ... (B) of subsection (b) of this section shall be considered as
having been on furlough or leave of absence during his period of training and
service in the armed forces, shall be so restored without loss of seniority, shall be
entitled to participate in insurance or other benefits offered by the employer pur-
suant to established rules and practices relating to employees on furlough or leave
of absence in effect with the employer at the time such person was inducted into
such forces ....
4 Id. The "other benefits" provisions, § 8(c) of the 1940 Act, was the subject of a
congressional comment by Senator Sheppard. The Senator was vague as to which benefits
the provision covered, limiting them to pension, bonus, insurance, and a catchall phrase
including "other beneficial programs." 86 CONG. REc. 10095 (1940) (remarks of Senator
Sheppard). See also Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957), wherein the
Second Circuit defined "other benefits" as a "fairly narrow group of economic advan-
tages" whose common quality was that "they were miscellaneous fringe benefits." Id.
at 738.
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from leave of absence. So interpreted, it appears to conflict not only
with the language of section 9(b), but also with the direction in section
9(c)(2) 5 that veterans be accorded such status as they would have en-
joyed had they remained continuously employed.
The Second Circuit recently explored this statutory confusion in
Palmarozzo v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co." The majority, in an opinion by
Judge Anderson, determined that severance pay qualified as a seniority
perquisite,7 i.e., benefit, preserved by the Act for those whose employ-
ment has been interrupted by military service. Judge Friendly, dissent-
ing, contended that the particular severance pay in issue was not a
perquisite of seniority, but rather one of the "other benefits" within
the meaning of section 9(c)(1). Accordingly, the dissent reasoned that
no severance benefits should accrue to the employee for the period of
his military service.
In Palmarozzo, the plaintiff, having worked for Coca-Cola both
before and after his military service, sued his former employer for
$200 in severance pay to which he would have been entitled had he
remained continuously employed. Furthermore, Palmarozzo sought to
compel Coca-Cola to contribute to a union retirement fund for the
period of his service in the armed forces. Both claims were based on a
collective bargaining agreement under which Coca-Cola was to make
payments based on the number of hours of compensated work ren-
dered by an employee.8 Under this service credit plan, an employee
received one-fourth credit for every four hundred hours worked, with
a one credit per year maximum.9 As a result of Coca-Cola's refusal to
credit Palmarozzo for the period of his military service, he was one-half
credit short of the five credits needed to receive severance payments
from the union.'0
550 U.S.C. § 459(c)(2) (1970):
(c) Service considered as furlough or leave of absence
(2) It is declared to be the sense of the Congress that any person who is
restored to a position in accordance with the provisions of paragraph . . . (B) of
subsection (b) of this section should be so restored in such manner as to give him
such status in his employment as he would have enjoyed if he had continued in
such employment continuously from the time of his entering the armed forces
until the time of his restoration to such employment.
6 490 F.2d 586 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 955 (1974).
7 Perquisites are "[elmoluments or incidental profits attaching to an office or official
position, beyond the salary or regular fees." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1299 (4th ed. rev.
1968).
8The contract between the employer and Local 812 of the International Teamsters
Union provided that Coca-Cola would contribute $.20 to a retirement fund for every
hour actually worked by an employee up to a maximum of 40 hours a week or 1600 hours
a year. 490 F.2d at 588.
9Id.
10 Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Coca-Cola contended that severance pay was a benefit conditioned
upon a valid work requirement necessitating actual fulfillment in order
for the benefit to be awarded the claimant. 1 Accordingly, Palmarozzo
would have had to work an actual eight thousand hours to receive the
five credits necessary for severance pay and would receive no work
credits for time spent in the service. Having failed to meet the actual
work-hours requirement, Palmarozzo would be limited to those "other
benefits" awarded to employees on furlough or leave of absence as
governed by section 9(c)(1) of the Act. In response to his former em-
ployer's arguments, Palmarozzo maintained that he was entitled to
those benefits enjoyed by a nonveteran employee who had never inter-
rupted his employment. In other words, he should be credited for time
spent in the military, since such benefits accrued automatically and lay
within the ambit of seniority provisions as protected by section 9(b). 12
Affirming the district court's judgment for the employee,13 the
Second Circuit awarded Palmarozzo the same benefits as would have
been accorded a nonveteran who had remained continuously em-
ployed.14 In so holding, the court relied upon the Supreme Court's
decision in Accardi v. Pennsylvania Railroad'5 wherein veteran firemen,
facing abolition of their positions, sought payment of a separation al-
lowance pursuant to a recently formulated strike settlement. Although
the severance pay in Accardi was to be determined by the length of an
employee's compensated service, an analysis of the plan revealed that a
mere seven days of actual work qualified for one year of compensated
service.' 6 In declaring the plan's work requirement to be a sham, the
Supreme Court ascertained that the severance pay was, in fact, based
on seniority, or length of service. Moreover, the veterans' right to the
payments was deemed to have automatically accrued during the period
of their military service.' 7
:l Id. at 589.
12 Id. at 594-96.
is In an unreported decision, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York granted summary judgment for the veteran employee.
14 490 F.2d at 590-93.
15 383 U.S. 225 (1966).
16 A year of compensated service was defined as any year in which an employee had
worked at least seven months, with one day of service sufficient to constitute a month.
Id. at 228.
17 Id. at 229-30. The Court in Accardi stated:
The requirements of the 1940 Act are not satisfied by giving returning veterans
seniority in some general abstract sense and then denying them the perquisites
and benefits that flow from it. We think it clear that the amount of these allow-
ances is just as much a perquisite of seniority as the more traditional benefits
such as work preference and order of lay-off and recall.
Id. at 230.
It is not essential for the veteran to be physically present at his job in order to be
[Vol. 49:372
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The Palmarozzo majority also placed reliance on a successor to
Accardi, Eagar v. Magma Copper Co.' Although the petitioner in
Eagar had worked the necessary 75 percent of the work shifts during the
year, he was denied vacation and holiday pay because, by entering
military service, he failed to satisfy the condition that he be on the
company's payroll on the first anniversary of the start of his employ-
ment. The Ninth Circuit upheld the denial of the benefits on the
ground that he had not technically fulfilled the company's work re-
quirements.' 9 In a per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court reversed,
merely citing to Accardi.20
In Palmarozzo, Judge Anderson determined that the service credit
plan involved therein much resembled Accardi's compensated service
plan.2' The court recognized that the Accardi benefits were actually
proportionate to length of service and were intended to reward the
employee for maintaining a continuing relationship with his em-
ployer.22 Moreover, the severance benefits compensated for loss of se-
niority rights which had accumulated with years of continuous em-
ployment, and thus, regardless of how the benefits were determined.
they were not compensation for actual work performed.23 Consequently,
the majority in Palmarozzo rejected the suggestion that it use a work
requirements analysis to review each severance plan individually.24 The
characterized as being continuously employed. See Altgens v. Associated Press, 188 F.2d
727 (5th Cir. 1951), wherein the theory is espoused that an employee's seniority begins
as soon as he receives his first pay check, and continues for as long as he is employed.
Vacation, sickness, and military service do not terminate the legal relationship between
employee and employer. Id. at 729.
18 389 U.S. 323 (1967) (per curiam).
19 Magma Copper Co. v. Eagar, 380 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd, 389 U.S. 323 (1967).
20 389 U.S. at 323, citing Accardi v. Pennsylvania PRR., 383 U.S. 225 (1966). The dissent
was of the view that Eagar was not entitled to receive vacation benefits because they
were not a seniority right. Justice Douglas, speaking for the dissent, explained that al-
though the length and amount of vacation pay clearly turn on seniority, "eligibility" for
vacation is controlled by the "other benefits" provision. Therefore, the applicable collec-
tive bargaining agreement must govern eligibility requirements. 389 U.S. at 325.
21490 F.2d at 588. The questionable validity of the majority's holding stems from
this conclusion.
22 Id. at 589. In analyzing the seniority system under review in Accardi, the Court
explained that for employees working at the same type of jobs in the same field and
class, the amount and value of seniority increase with the length of seniority. Therefore,
since employees with the greatest seniority were forfeiting more rights and benefits than
their more recently hired counterparts, they should receive the highest severance pay.
See Accardi v. Pennsylvania 11.1., 383 U.S. 225, 230 (1966).
23 Although the severance benefits were not considered as compensation, the Second
Circuit noted that such benefits are as valuable a right as any other seniority provision.
Severance pay acts as security protection against layoffs and strikes in a large industrial
organization and should be awarded to an employee who has rendered continuous service.
490 F.2d at 589, citing M. WORTMAN g: G. Wrrr.pELD, LABOR RELATIONS AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 228, 256 (1969).
24490 F.2d at 591. But see Haggard, Veterans' Reemployment Rights and the "Esca-
1975]
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court reasoned that an employee's right to rely on severance pay should
not depend on whether severance benefits in a union contract are based
on length of service or actual work performed. 25 Furthermore, once a
benefit has been deemed a seniority right, individual contracts should
be liberally construed in favor of the veteran. 26
The majority attempted to draw further support for its position
by way of the "escalator principle," first enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &Repair Corp.27 Often used to
lator Principle," 51 BosroN U.L. REv. 539 (1971), wherein the author suggests that courts
test union contracts to discover if they contain valid work requirements. A system of
analysis is outlined to aid in the determination of whether the claimed benefits depend
wholly or partially on seniority accumulated by the employee.
25490 F.2d at 591. The court pointed out that the Act's purpose would be defeated
if collective bargaining agreements were allowed to reclassify seniority perquisites by
making them contingent on actual services rendered. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock &
Repair Corp., 328 U.S. 275 (1946), where the Supreme Court stated: "[N]o practice of
employers or agreements between employers and unions can cut down the service adjust-
ment benefits which Congress has secured the veteran under the- Act." Id. at 285. But see
Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Campbell, 337 U.S. 521 (1949), wherein the Court
resolved a conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits as to whether a collective bar-
gaining agreement, negotiated in the veteran's absence, could be controlling. The new
contract, in modifying certain seniority provisions, entitled union officials to higher senior-
ity in the event of layoffs. Subsequently, although union officials with less actual seniority
were retained, the veteran plaintiff was temporarily laid off. Additionally, the employer
refused to compensate the veteran for the period of the layoff. Under similar circum-
stances, the Third Circuit had held that the agreement governed. See Payne v. Wright
Aeronautical Corp., 162 F.2d 549 (3d Cir. 1947); DiMaggio v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162
F.2d 546 (3d Cir. 1947); Gauweiler v. Elastic Stop Nut Corp., 162 F.2d 448 (3d Cir. 1947).
The Ninth Circuit held to the contrary. See Aeronautical Indus. Dist. Lodge 727 v. Camp-
bell, 169 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 521 (1949). By reversing the Ninth Circuit
in Aeronautical, the Supreme Court apparently adopted the view that the contract was
binding.
26490 F.2d at 592, citing Fishgold -v. Sullivan Drydock Corp., 328 U.S. 275, 285 (1946).
The Accardi Court had emphasized that although seniority derives its meaning from
private employment contracts, employers and unions will not be allowed to deprive a
veteran of rights guaranteed by the Act by using "transparent labels," such as "compen-
sated service," if in fact the benefit is conditioned on seniority. 383 U.S. at 229.
27328 U.S. 275 (1946). Although the Fishgold decision was mainly concerned with
whether the word "discharge," as used in industry, meant the same thing as a layoff, it
is cited primarily for the escalator analogy. See Note, Labor Law-Veterans-Collective
Bargaining Agreements and "Superseniority", 46 COLUM. L. REv. 1030 (1946), for a dis-
cussion of the impact of Fishgold on industry.
Under the general escalator principle, the veteran is not to lose any increase in his
seniority status due solely to his military absence. However, the Fishgold Court warned
against giving the veteran a "superseniority" status which he could not have attained had
he remained continuously employed. See United States Selective Service, Local Board Mem.
No. 190-A, pt. IV, l(c) (May 20, 1944), for the Director of Selective Service's encour-
agement of "superseniority." The memorandum stated that under the Act the veteran
was to be reinstated to his former position or one of similar status and pay, even though
a nonveteran with greater seniority might be replaced as a result. Nonetheless, the
Second Circuit denied the veteran the preferential treatment he sought. The Supreme
Court affirmed, stating that the Act's provision would be distorted if permitted to grant
the veteran a greater seniority increase than he would have received had he not entered
the military. 328 U.S. at 285-86.
[Vol. 49:372
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describe an employee's rise in seniority rank, the escalator analogy
provides that the veteran does not return to the same step of the se-
niority escalator as that which he left. Instead, he returns at the level
he would have reached had he remained continuously employed. 2
Citing both Fishgold and Taylor v. South Pacific Co.,29 the Palmarozzo
court maintained that depriving the petitioner of severance pay would,
in essence, amount to removing severance benefits from the seniority
escalator. 30
In a vigorous dissent,31 Judge Friendly perceived that the com-
pensated service plan present in Accardi was designed to distinguish
between old and new employees, thereby conferring benefits in ac-
cordance with length of employment. Thus, he reasoned that the par-
ticular terms of the contract constituted the prime motivation for the
Court's holding that the severance benefits were based on seniority.3 2
The Accardi decision, he believed, would be binding in Palmarozzo
only if the plans in both cases were essentially alike. Examining the
methods of calculation used in each contract, Judge Friendly concluded
that Coca-Cola's service credit plan differed from the Accardi plan in
that it employed a different standard of computing severance benefits.33
The Coca-Cola plan was based on actual work and thus was not within
the Act's seniority protection. Therefore, it was one of the "other
benefits" to be awarded a veteran as if he had been on leave of absence.
Although undisturbed by mere military absence, a veteran's seniority standing may
be affected for other reasons. For example, in Trailmobile Co. v. Whirls, 331 U.S. 40
(1947), the Supreme Court allowed a veteran's seniority status to be lowered after a parent
company had merged with its subsidiary. The suit arose since the seniority of the em-
ployees in the subsidiary company was to be computed from the date the merger took
place, rather than from the date they first began employment with the subsidiary com-
pany. The Court decided this practice was not so arbitrary as to entitle petitioners to
legal relief. Id. at 59-60.
28 The escalator principle was reaffirmed in Oakley v. Louisville & Nashville R.R.,
338 U.S. 278 (1949). In Oakley, the Sixth Circuit attempted to narrow the broad scope of
seniority rights announced in Fishgold. Deciding that the veteran petitioner should be
accorded the rights of an employee on leave, the court of appeals figuratively returned
him to the seniority escalator at the same level of employment which he left. The Su-
preme Court reversed, holding that the Act required the veteran to be treated as though
continuously employed and therefore entitled to move up to a higher position. Id. at 284.
29308 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Cal. 1969). Citing the Accardi automatic accrual rule, the
Taylor court granted severance pay to a veteran who requested it in lieu of reemployment.
In so holding, the court noted that severance pay represented a benefit which the vet-
eran would have been automatically qualified to receive had he remained in continuous
employment. Id. at 610.
30490 F.2d at 590.
31 Id. at 593.
32 1n Judge Friendiy's opinion, the scope of the Accardi decision could be legiti-
mately applied only to those collective bargaining agreements which did not contain
work requirements as a condition precedent for receiving severance pay. Id. at 594.
33 Id.
1975]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Since the contracting parties had previously agreed that time spent on
leave of absence would not be considered in computing severance
benefits,34 Judge Friendly contended that Palmarozzo should not be
credited for work he did not perform and, as a result, could not recover
in the present action.85
Responding to the majority's utilization of the escalator principle,
Judge Friendly reasoned that its applicability in the present instance
was doubtful.36 Use of the principle in Palmarozzo would be meaning-
ful only if the benefit in question were based on seniority. Believing,
however, that Coca-Cola and the Teamsters Union had conditioned
benefits on valid work requirements, not on seniority, Judge Friendly
did not feel the escalator principle was applicable. Since severance pay
did not automatically accrue to Palmarozzo at the expiration of a
specified period of service, the escalator theory should not be used to
place the employee in a status which he could only have achieved
through his own work efforts.37
Significantly, both the Accardi and Eagar decisions are consistent
with Judge Friendly's dissent in Palmarozzo. The Accardi Court dis-
tinguished between benefits based on an employee's total work service
and those benefits dependent on seniority or length of employment,
determining that severance payments which automatically accrued by
length of service were perquisites of seniority. 8 This distinction sup-
ports Judge Friendly's proposition that a benefit which does not auto-
matically accrue is not a seniority benefit within the Act's protection.
It is some "other benefit" which can be earned only by the employee's
34 Id. at 593.
35 Id. at 594.
36 Id. at 596.
37 Id. McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R., 357 U.S. 265 (1958), supports Judge
Friendly's theory that a benefit conditioned on something other than mere length of
tenure is not a seniority perquisite. In McKinney, the Court considered whether the
plaintiff was entitled to an advanced position if such promotion depended on fitness
and ability. The Court noted that a promotion would be awarded to a veteran only
if that promotion, were contingent on seniority or automatic advancement. If, however,
the advancement were based on skill or ability, the veteran could not claim it as a
seniority benefit. See generally Bassett v. Texas & Pac. Ry., 258 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1958)
(promotion speculative since advancement from apprentice to car-man was neither based
on contract nor automatic but depended upon railroad's discretion); Palmquist v. Buhl
Sons Co., 179 F. Supp. 638 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (retroactive advancement denied where
promotions from checker to the higher position of order board were not always based
on seniority).
But see Borges v. Art Steel Co., 246 F.2d 735 (2d Cir. 1957), where the Second Circuit
decided that since plaintiffs were laborers and the only requirement for a pay increase
was to be on the job for a certain period, the defendant's contention that the service
requirement rewarded skill and experience was not valid. See also Addison v. Tennessee
Coal, Iron & R.R., 204 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1953).
38 383 U.S. at 229-30.
[Vol. 49:372
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satisfying existing valid work requirements. Notably, the Eagar Court
did not declare the claimed vacation and holiday pay involved therein
to be seniority perquisites.39 Thus, it could be argued they were "other
benefits" which were awarded to Eagar because he had fulfilled the
company-imposed work conditions. This interpretation would fully
support Judge Friendly's contention that neither Accardi nor Eagar
supports the proposition that benefits automatically accrue to the vet-
eran employee regardless of actual work requirements. 40
The distinction between benefits based on seniority and those de-
pendent upon valid work requirements has often been drawn by courts
which have examined vacation benefits, an area somewhat analogous
to severance pay. In light of Accardi and Eagar, the circuits have split
over the issue whether vacation benefits are seniority perquisites or
"other benefits." The more liberal view,41 embraced by a number of
circuits, 42 sanctions protection of vacation pay as a seniority benefit.43
However, numerous decisions, including early Second Circuit cases,44
39 See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
40490 F.2d at 593, 595. In Cormett v. Automatic Elec. Co., 323 F. Supp. 1373, 1377
(N.D. IM. 1971), a district court strongly objected to legitimate work requirements being
ignored:
If Eagar truly represents a conclusion by the Supreme Court that § 9 of the Act
grants to returning veterans everything to which they would have been entitled
had they remained on their civilian jobs, they would be entitled not only to bulk
annual vacation pay but, presumably, also to pay for single vacation days granted
by the employer. . . even though they did not work at any point in time near
those holidays or for even one day during the year. This construction logically
would require the employer even to pay the returning veteran such wages for
the period of his military service as would have automatically accrued to him had
he remained on the job instead of entering the armed forces. We cannot believe
that this was the intent of Congress when it passed the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act and we do not believe that the Supreme Court has so held.
Id. at 1377 (emphasis added).
41 See 490 F.2d at 593, where the court relied upon the following language from the
Accardi opinion:
Without attempting in this case to determine the exact scope of this provision
of § 8(c) it is enough to say that we consider that it was intended to add certain
protections to the veteran and not to take away those which are granted him by
§ 8(b)(B) and the other clauses of § 8(c).
383 U.S. at 232.
42 See Ewert v. Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., 477 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam);
Locaynia v. American Airlines, Inc., 457 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982
(1972); Edwards v. Clinchfield 1-R., 408 F.2d 5 (6th Cir. 1969); Morton v. Gulf, Mobile &
Ohio RLR., 405 F.2d 415 (8th Cir. 1969).
43 In MacLaughlin v. Union Switch & Signal Co., 166 F.2d 46, 48 (3d Cir. 1948), the
court asserted the proposition that vacation benefits are as valuable as pensions and in-
surance plans, and that it was Congress' intention, when passing the Act, to protect these
other rights.
44 See, e.g., Siaskiewicz v. General Elec. Co., 166 F.2d 463 (2d Cir. 1948), wherein
General Electric denied vacations to veterans because they had not worked six months
as required by contract. The court held that since vacation pay represented compensation
for work actually done and was not a seniority benefit, the six-month period was a le-
gitimate work requirement and did not violate the Act's seniority provision. Since a non-
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have denied vacation pay to reinstated veterans who have not fulfilled
the work requirements in their union contracts. 45 In Kasmeier v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railroad,46 the Tenth Circuit held that
an employee who had not worked the 110 days required by the union
contract was not entitled to vacation pay. The court found that the
vacation benefits were not seniority rights which accrued with the
passage of time and therefore determined that time spent in the mili-
tary should not be counted towards the 110-day requirement. 47 More-
over, the court found its decision fully consistent with both Accardi and
Eagar, since it interpreted these two cases in the same manner as did
Judge Friendly in Palmarozzo. Whereas the veteran in Eagar had ac-
tually met the compensated work requirements and thereby earned his
benefits, the veteran in Kasmeier had not.48 Of similar import is the
decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dugger v. Missouri Pacific Railroad,49
concluding that a veteran's right to vacation pay depended upon the
terms of the labor agreement between the railroad and its employees.50
In addition, the Seventh Circuit, granting a veteran's claim to vacation
pay in Ewert v. Wrought Washer Manufacturing Co.,51 suggested that
it might not have allowed recovery if the vacation pay were pure com-
pensation for services rendered and therefore independent of seniority.52
veteran employee who had failed to satisfy the work requirements would not be entitled
to vacation pay, the court reasoned that granting pay to the veteran plaintiff would be
awarding him the "superseniority" prohibited by Fishgold. Id. at 466. In Dwyer v. Crosby
Co., 167 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1948), the court again denied a veteran's claim for vacation.
pay. In Dwyer, the court considered the plaintiff as having been on a leave of absence.
Accordingly, since vacations ordinarily mean a release from work, it was deemed unlikely
that the Act entitled a man on leave of absence to a vacation. Id. at 569.
45 See Kasmeier v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971);
Dugger v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 907 (1969).
46 437 F.2d 151 (10th Cir. 1971).
47 Id. at 154, 156. See Hoffman v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 477 F.2d 860, 863 (3d Cir.
1973). In Hoffman, the Third Circuit interpreted Kasmeier as containing a valid work
requirement since an employee only received benefits when he worked the full period,
and not a portion thereof.
48 437 F.2d at 155.
49 403 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1968) (per curiam), aff'g 276 F. Supp. 496 (S.D. Tex. 1967),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 907 (1969).
50 See also Fees v. Bethlehem Corp., 335 F. Supp. 487 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (under a union
contract requiring six consecutive months of work in the preceding year for vacation
eligibility, vacation pay was not a seniority right to which the veteran, who had not met
the six months requirement, was automatically entitled); Tuttle v. United States Plywood
Corp., 293 F. Supp. 401 (D. Ore. 1968) (reemployed veterans denied recovery where, pur-
suant to a collective bargaining plan, the right to holiday and vacation pay arose only
after the employee had actually worked the required number of hours); Bradley v.
General Motors Corp., 283 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Mo. 1968) (mem.) (a paid absence allowance
credit held not to be a seniority benefit since based on actual employee service in a
specific number of pay periods).
51477 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
52 Both Ewert and Locaynia v. American Airlines, 457 F2d 1253 (9th Cir.), cert.
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It would appear that the severance payments in Palmarozzo were
conditioned upon actual hours worked and not upon seniority. While
the so-called work requirement in Accardi was a sham and benefits were,
in fact, based on seniority, such was not the case in Palmarozzo. The five
service credits, representing 8000 hours of work necessary for Palma-
rozzo to receive severance pay, certainly met the test of a valid work
requirement.53 Since the service credits did not automatically accrue,
the severance pay was not a seniority perquisite. Therefore, Judge
Friendly correctly concluded that it constituted one of the "other
benefits" which the veteran was entitled to receive on the same basis
as an employee who had been on leave of absence. Consequently, the
time spent by Palmarozzo in military service should not have been in-
cluded in the determination of his right to severance pay.
As evidenced by the conflicting decisions among the circuits, the
area of veterans' reemployment rights is extremely uncertain. The
source of the trouble can be traced to the very statute which protects
these rights. Although in effect for over thirty years, the Act has yet
to be definitively interpreted. Additionally, since they are open to
several different constructions, the Accardi and Eagar decisions have
only served to increase the confusion. The solution lies in a forceful
Supreme Court decision which, in clarifying the apparent contra-
dictions in the Act, will produce a uniform rule regarding seniority
benefits for the veteran. Such a ruling may soon be handed down, for
Foster v. Dravo Corp.,54 a vacation benefits case, has been granted
denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972), were cited by the Palmarozzo majority for the proposition
that work requirements are no longer valid. Neither case, however, lends support to this
proposition. In Locaynia, although the veteran was awarded vacation benefits, this in all
probability resulted because the collective bargaining agreement contained no express
work requirements for vacation eligibility. Significantly, the contract, while requiring
one year of continuous service, provided that time spent in the military should be included
for purposes of eligibility.
Similarly, the Ewert decision was not based on the validity or invalidity of any bar-
gaining agreement condition. Relying on the holding in Eagar, the Ewert court went no
further than to mechanically label the vacation benefits in issue seniority perquisites
simply because they were vacation benefits. 477 F.2d at 129.
For a complete analysis of Locaynia and the right of the reinstated veteran to vaca-
tion pay, see Note, Reemployment Rights: The Veteran and the Vacation Benefit, 53
BOSTON U.L. Ray. 480 (1973).
503 n a footnote, the Palmarozzo majority argued that, even under close scrutiny,
Coca-Cola's service credit plan could not be considered a valid work requirement. The
argument made was that the company's failure to credit employees with hours worked
in excess of 1600 hours illustrated that the plan was meant to reward employees for
continuous service. This argument appears tenuous, however, in light of the fact that
each service credit had to be earned by 1600 hours of actual work and that the employee
was not credited with hours spent on vacation or hours lost due to illness. See 490 F.2d
at 591 nA.
54490 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3187 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1974)
(No. 73-1773). In Dravo, the veteran plaintiff, returning from service, was held not to be
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certiorari. A natural sequel to the Accardi automatic accrual rule would
be the approval by the Court of the work requirements analysis es-
poused by Judge Friendly in Palmarozzo.*
Judith A. Turner
entitled to full vacation benefits under the union's collective bargaining contract. The
agreement required an employee to work 25 weeks in 12 months preceding December 31
in order to qualify for vacation pay. Since the plaintiff worked for defendant corporation
only 9 weeks before entering the military in 1967 and 13 weeks after he resumed employ-
ment in 1968, he did not fulfill the contract terms. Interestingly, however, the Third
Circuit vacated and remanded, noting that the plaintiff was not prevented from claiming
a pro rata share of his vacation benefits. This seems to indicate an effort by the court
to achieve a compromise solution between former decisions which awarded full benefits
to the veteran and those which denied him any benefits at all.
*Editor's Note. While this article was being printed, the Supreme Court decided
Foster v. Dravo, 43 U.S.L.W. 4227 (U.S. Feb. 18, 1975). See note 54 supra. The Court af-
firmed the lower court rulings that the veteran, Foster, was not entitled to full vacation
benefits, utilizing the approach suggested by Judge Friendly in Palmarozzo. The Court's
approval of the work requirements analysis advanced by Judge Friendly and its applica-
bility to various types of benefits is apparent from the following language of the opinion:
Generally, the presence of a work requirement is strong evidence that the benefit
in question was intended as a form of compensation. Of course, as in the Accardi
case, the work requirement may be so insubstantial that it appears plainly de-
signed to measure time on the payroll rather than hours on the job; in that
event, the Act requires that the benefit be granted to returning veterans. But
where the work requirement constitutes a bona fide effort to compensate for work
actually performed, the fact that it correlates only loosely with the benefit is not
enough to invoke the statutory guarantee.
43 U.S.L.W. at 4229.
